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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 13-3824 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
MARC GILL, 
 
       Appellant 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey  
(D.C. Crim. No. 09-cr-00151) 
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
January 16, 2014 
 
Before:  AMBRO, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 24, 2014) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellant Marc Gill appeals from an order of the District Court denying his 
motion to modify sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  For the reasons that follow, we will 
dismiss this untimely appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
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 Gill pleaded guilty in 2009 in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey to possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 
841(a).  With a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, Gill’s 
advisory Guidelines imprisonment range was 262–327 months.  At sentencing, the 
District Court found that Gill was a career offender.  In anticipation of upcoming 
amendments to the Guidelines, the District Court then applied the career offender 
Guidelines that would have applied had Gill’s offense involved powder cocaine.  The 
adjusted Guidelines range was 151–188 months, and, on May 18, 2010, the District Court 
sentenced Gill to a term of imprisonment of 162 months.  Gill did not appeal the criminal 
judgment. 
 Subsequently, the U.S. Sentencing Commission promulgated Amendment 750, 
which lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine.  After the Commission made 
Amendment 750 retroactive, Gill moved under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) for a reduction of 
sentence.  In an order entered on June 4, 2013, the District Court denied the motion. 
Apparently, Gill did not timely receive a copy of the District Court’s order 
denying his section 3582(c)(2) motion.  On or about July 2, 2013, Gill wrote to the 
District Court to inquire about the status of his motion.  After finally receiving a copy of 
the order denying his motion (on July 23, 2013), Gill moved on August 1, 2013, for an 
extension of time in which to file a notice of appeal.  In that motion, he speculated that 
the District Court Clerk’s Office had mailed a copy of the order denying his motion to his 
former counsel when it was first issued; if so, counsel had not passed the order on to him.  
3 
 
The District Court granted Gill’s motion to extend the time to appeal, and then, on 
August 16, 2013, Gill filed his notice of appeal. 
 Our Clerk advised the parties that we might act summarily to dispose of the appeal 
pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, and invited responses.  The 
Government submitted a response, in which it moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of 
appellate jurisdiction as untimely filed, invoking Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
4(b)’s “rigid” deadline. 
 We will dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction because it was not 
timely filed.  The time limit for filing a criminal appeal set forth in Rule 4(b) is rigid but 
not jurisdictional; it may be waived if not invoked by the Government.  See Bowles v. 
Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007).  An untimely appeal must be dismissed, however, if 
the Government objects.  Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 328-29 
(3d Cir. 2010).  In United States v. Muhammud, 701 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2012), we held 
that the Government may object to timeliness “at any point up to and including in its 
merits brief.”  Id. at 111.  Here, the Government has objected in its summary action 
response and invoked Rule 4(b).  Therefore, we must dismiss the appeal if it is indeed 
untimely. 
 We conclude that the appeal is untimely filed.  Under Rule 4(b), Gill had 14 days 
to appeal from June 4, 2013, the date when final judgment on his section 3582(c)(2) 
motion was entered.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i).  Gill did not file his notice of appeal 
until 73 days following entry of that order.  Accordingly, it was untimely filed unless Gill 
was entitled to an extension.  Under Rule 4(b)(4), “[u]pon a finding of excusable neglect 
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or good cause, the district court may -- before or after the time [to appeal] has expired, 
with or without motion and notice -- extend the time to file a notice of appeal for a period 
not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this Rule 
4(b).  Fed. R. App. Pro. 4(b)(4) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, the District Court had no 
authority to extend Rule 4(b)(1)(A)’s time limit by more than 30 days beyond the original 
deadline.  This 30-day period expired on July 18, 2013, nearly a month before Gill filed 
his notice of appeal. 
We note that Gill sent a letter to the District Court in early July 2013, and thus 
before the maximum 30-day extension period expired.  The letter does not qualify as a 
notice of appeal.  Gill simply asked about the status of his case; he did not indicate an 
intent to appeal any judgment or otherwise comply with Rule 3, Fed. R. App. Pro. 
3(c)(1)(A)-(C).  A status request is not the equivalent of a notice of appeal.  In addition, 
the District Court’s alleged failure to notify Gill of the denial of his section 3582(c)(2) 
motion does not excuse his untimely appeal.  Where, as here, Rule 4(b) does not 
“provid[e] otherwise, the clerk’s failure to give notice does not affect the time to appeal, 
or relieve—or authorize the court to relieve—a party’s failure to appeal within the 
allowed time.”  Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 49(c).  Cf. Baker v. United States, 670 F.3d 448, 461 
(3d Cir. 2012) (“[W]here . . . the delay is caused by the clerk’s office, the rule of Fiorelli 
and Grana does not apply”).1 
                                              
1
 In any event, Gill’s section 3582(c)(2) motion certainly appears to lack merit.  A 
“defendant may be eligible for a reduction of sentence if the sentence was ‘based on a 
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission’ and 
if ‘a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate 
jurisdiction as untimely filed. 
                                                                                                                                                  
Commission.’”  United States v. Flemming, 723 F.3d 407, 410 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).  The applicable Guidelines range for a defendant like Gill is the 
range calculated pursuant to the career offender guideline, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, and not the 
range calculated after applying any departure or variance.  Flemming, 723 F.3d at 412. 
Gill’s section 3582(c)(2) motion lacked merit, at a minimum, because Amendment 750 
did not reduce Gill’s career offender guideline range.  See id. at 413.     
